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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
CERT Advisory CA-2003-07 Remote Buffer Overflow in Sendmail
Original release date: March 3, 2003
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
Systems Affected
* Sendmail Pro (all versions)
* Sendmail Switch 2.1 prior to 2.1.5
* Sendmail Switch 2.2 prior to 2.2.5
* Sendmail Switch 3.0 prior to 3.0.3
* Sendmail for NT 2.X prior to 2.6.2
* Sendmail for NT 3.0 prior to 3.0.3
* Systems running open-source sendmail versions prior to 8.12.8,
including UNIX and Linux systems
Overview
There is a vulnerability in sendmail that may allow remote
attackers to gain the privileges of the sendmail daemon, typically
root.
I. Description
Researchers at Internet Security Systems (ISS) have
discovered a remotely exploitable vulnerability in
sendmail. This vulnerability could allow an intruder to gain
control of a vulnerable sendmail server.
Most organizations have a variety of mail transfer agents (MTAs) at
various locations within their network, with at least one exposed to
the Internet. Since sendmail is the most popular MTA, most
medium-sized to large organizations are likely to have at least one
vulnerable sendmail server. In addition, many UNIX and Linux
workstations provide a sendmail implementation that is enabled and
running by default.
This vulnerability is message-oriented as opposed to
connection-oriented. That means that the vulnerability is triggered by
the contents of a specially-crafted email message rather than by
lower-level network traffic. This is important because an MTA that
does not contain the vulnerability will pass the malicious message
along to other MTAs that may be protected at the network level. In
other words, vulnerable sendmail servers on the interior of a network
are still at risk, even if the site's border MTA uses software other
than sendmail. Also, messages capable of exploiting this vulnerability
may pass undetected through many common packet filters or firewalls.
Sendmail has indicated to the CERT/CC that this vulnerability has been
successfully exploited in a laboratory environment. We do not believe
that this exploit is available to the public. However, this
vulnerability is likely to draw significant attention from the
intruder community, so the probability of a public exploit is high.
A successful attack against an unpatched sendmail system will
not leave any messages in the system log. However, on a patched
system, an attempt to exploit this vulnerability will leave
the following log message:
Dropped invalid comments from header address
Although this does not represent conclusive evidence of an
attack, it may be useful as an indicator.
A patched sendmail server will drop invalid headers, thus
preventing downstream servers from receiving them.
The CERT/CC is tracking this issue as VU#398025. This reference
number corresponds to CVE candidate CAN-2002-1337.
For more information, please see
http://www.sendmail.org http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.8.html
http://www.sendmail.com/security/
http://www.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=21950
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/398025
II. Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an
attacker to gain the privileges of the sendmail daemon,
typically root. Even vulnerable sendmail servers on the interior
of a given network may be at risk since the vulnerability is
triggered from the contents of a malicious email message.
III. Solution
Apply a patch from Sendmail
Sendmail has produced patches for versions 8.9, 8.10, 8.11, and
8.12. However, the vulnerability also exists in earlier
versions of the code; therefore, site administrators using an
earlier version are encouraged to upgrade to 8.12.8. These patches
are located at
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.security.cr.patch
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.11.6.security.cr.patch
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.9.3.security.cr.patch
Apply a patch from your vendor
Many vendors include vulnerable sendmail servers as part of
their software distributions. We have notified vendors of this
vulnerability and recorded their responses in the systems
affected section of VU#398025. Several vendors have provided
a statement for direct inclusion in this advisory; these
statements are available in Appendix A.
Enable the RunAsUser option
There is no known workaround for this vulnerability. Until a patch
can be applied, you may wish to set the RunAsUser option to
reduce the impact of this vulnerability. As a good general
practice, the CERT/CC recommends limiting the privileges of
an application or service whenever possible.
Appendix A. - Vendor Information
This appendix contains information provided by vendors for
this advisory. As vendors report new information to the
CERT/CC, we will update this section and note the changes in our
revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below,
we have not received their comments.
Apple Computer, Inc.
Security Update 2003-03-03 is available to fix this
issue. Packages are available for Mac OS X 10.1.5 and Mac OS X
10.2.4. It should be noted that sendmail is not enabled by
default on Mac OS X, so only those systems which have explicitly
enabled it are susceptible to the vulnerability. All customers
of Mac OS X, however, are encouraged to apply this update to their
systems.
Avaya, Inc.
Avaya is aware of the vulnerability and is investigating
impact. As new information is available this statement will be
updated.
BSD/OS
Wind River Systems has created patches for this problem which
are available from the normal locations for each release. The
relevant patches are M500-006 for BSD/OS version 5.0 or the Wind
River Platform for Server Appliances 1.0, M431-002 for BSD/OS
4.3.1, or M420-032 for BSD/OS 4.2 systems.
Cisco Systems
Cisco is investigating this issue. If we determine any of our products
are vulnerable that information will be available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
Cray Inc.
The code supplied by Cray, Inc. in Unicos, Unicos/mk, and
Unicos/mp may be vulnerable. Cray has opened SPRs 724749
and 724750 to investigate.
Cray, Inc. is not vulnerable for the MTA systems.
Hewlett-Packard Company
SOURCE:
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP Services
Software Security Response Team
x-ref: SSRT3469 sendmail
HP will provide notice of the availability of patches through
standard security bulletin announcements and be available from
your normal HP Services support channel.
IBM Corporation
The AIX operating system is vulnerable to the sendmail
issues discussed in releases 4.3.3, 5.1.0 and 5.2.0.
A temporary patch is available through an efix package which
can be found at
ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/sendmail_efix.tar.Z
IBM will provide the following official fixes:
APAR number for AIX 4.3.3: IY40500 (available approx.
03/12/2003)
APAR number for AIX 5.1.0: IY40501 (available approx.
04/28/2003)
APAR number for AIX 5.2.0: IY40502 (available approx.
04/28/2003)
Openwall GNU/*/Linux
Openwall GNU/*/Linux is not vulnerable. We use Postfix as the MTA, not
sendmail.
Red Hat Inc.
Updated sendmail packages that are not vulnerable to this issue
are available for Red Hat Linux, Red Hat Advanced Server, and
Red Hat Advanced Workstation. Red Hat Network users can update
their systems using the 'up2date' tool.
Red Hat Linux:
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-073.html
Red Hat Linux Advanced Server, Advanced Workstation:
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2003-074.html
SGI
SGI acknowledges VU#398025 reported by CERT and has
released an advisory to address the vulnerability on IRIX.
Refer to SGI Security Advisory 20030301-01-P available from
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/20030301-01-P
or http://www.sgi.com/support/security/.
The Sendmail Consortium
The Sendmail Consortium suggests that sites upgrade to
8.12.8 if possible. Alternatively, patches are available for
8.9, 8.10, 8.11, and 8.12 on http://www.sendmail.org/
Sendmail, Inc.
All commercial releases including Sendmail Switch, Sendmail Advanced
Message Server (which includes the Sendmail Switch MTA), Sendmail for
NT, and Sendmail Pro are affected by this issue. Patch information is
available at http://www.sendmail.com/security.
_________________________________________________________________
Our thanks to Internet Security Systems, Inc. for discovering this
problem, and to Eric Allman, Claus Assmann, and Greg Shapiro of
Sendmail for notifying us of this problem. We thank both groups for
their assistance in coordinating the response to this problem.
_________________________________________________________________
Authors: Jeffrey P. Lanza and Shawn V. Hernan
______________________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-07.html
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by
email. Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for
more information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available
from our web site http://www.cert.org/
To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and
bulletins, send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in
the body of your message
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* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
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_________________________________________________________________
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University.
Revision History
Mar 03, 2003: Initial release
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(92569) /Muhammad Faisal Rauf Danka <mfrd@attitudex.com>/(Ombruten)