6739615 2001-07-12 12:41 +0400 /110 rader/ 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Sänt av: joel@lysator.liu.se
Importerad: 2001-07-12 21:16 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Externa svar till: 3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <17938>
Ärende: SECURITY.NNOV: directory traversal and path globing in multiple archivers
------------------------------------------------------------
Hello,
Topic: Directory traversal and path globing in
multiple archivers
Author: 3APA3A <3APA3A@security.nnov.ru>
Affected Software: GNU tar <= 1.13.19, Info-Zip UnZip <= 5.42,
RARSoft rar <= 2.02, PKWare pkzipc <= 4.00
Not affected: rar 2.80, WinZIP 8.0
Risk: average
Released: July, 2, 2001
SECURITY.NNOV advisories: http://www.security.nnov.ru/advisories
Background:
Archive extraction is usually treated by users as a safe operation.
There are few problems with files extraction though.
Problem(s):
Among them: huge files with high compression ratio are able to fill
memory/disk (see "Antivirus scanner DoS with zip archives" thread on
Vuln-Dev), special device names and special characters in file names,
directory traversal (dot-dot bug). Probably, directory traversal is
most dangerous among this bugs, because it allows to craft archive
which will trojan system on extraction. This problem is known for
software developers, and newer archivers usually have some kind of
protection. But in some cases this protection is weak and can be
bypassed. I did very quick (approx. 30 minutes, so may be I've missed
something) researches on few popular archivers. Results are below.
Detailed info:
GNU tar (all platforms):
tar below 1.13.19 including latest releases has no any ".." or
absolute path protection. Tar development team was contacted. They
replied they're aware of problem and current development version
1.13.19 implements some kind of protection but it doesn't work for
most cases due to bug in coding. Exploitation scenario was passed
back to development team. I hope it will work then 1.13.19 will be
finally released. See attached patch (tar-1.13.19.patch). 1.13.19
sources can be obtained from ftp://alpha.gnu.org/gnu/tar/
Info-Zip's UnZip (all platforms):
all versions have neither .. nor absolute path protection. No reply
from vendor. See attached patch (unzip-5.42.patch).
PKWare's PKZip (Windows):
console version was tested. It's vulnerable, if archive is extracted
with -rec (recursive) option. If this option is not given archive is
extracted without directory structure. All versions up to latest 4.00
are vulnerable. Program is shareware, no sources available. Vendor
contacted but status of patch unknown.
RARsoft (Eugene Roshal's) RAR (all platforms):
Directory traversal protection was implemented in rar 2.02. This
protection can be bypassed. Eugene Roshal was contacted and replied
latest version of rar (2.80) is absolutely safe. It's true, but 2.02
is latest available version in most Unix ports (2.80 is available for
Windows and Linux, you can use Linux version if your system supports
Linux emulation). Program is shareware, no sources available.
WinZip (Windows):
Behavior is close to ideal. Console version doesn't extract files
with ".." until special switch is not selected, windowed version
warns user on ".." about possible impacts of such extraction.
Exploitation:
Exploitation of path globing and directory traversal under Windows
exploitation is trivial. On most unix system to exploit directory
traversal you should guess level of directory file will be extracted
to. tar and rar are able to create files with permission different
from umask, it makes it possible to create executables. Only tar
overwrites target files without prompt by default.
Demo archives can be found on
http://www.security.nnov.ru/advisories/archdt.asp
Workaround:
List content of archive before extraction if archive was obtained
from untrusted source (but have in mind that name of the file can be
with something like ../^H^H^H - do not trust your eyes, use some
program). Never automate archive extraction, or use jail if you need
automation. Be sure never run extraction from user with elevated
privileges.
Solution:
Wait for vendor patch or use checked archivers or apply attached
patches on your own risk.
--
http://www.security.nnov.ru
/\_/\
{ . . } |\
+--oQQo->{ ^ }<-----+ \
| 3APA3A U 3APA3A }
+-------------o66o--+ /
|/
You know my name - look up my number (The Beatles)
(6739615) /3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>/--------
Bilaga (application/octet-stream) i text 6739616
Bilaga (application/octet-stream) i text 6739617
6739616 2001-07-12 12:41 +0400 /41 rader/ 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Bilagans filnamn: "tar-1.13.19.patch"
Importerad: 2001-07-12 21:16 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Externa svar till: 3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <17939>
Bilaga (text/plain) till text 6739615
Ärende: Bilaga (tar-1.13.19.patch) till: SECURITY.NNOV: directory traversal and path globing in multiple archivers
------------------------------------------------------------
*** misc.c.orig Sat Jan 13 08:59:29 2001
--- misc.c Mon Jul 9 15:45:09 2001
***************
*** 201,217 ****
{
char const *p = name + FILESYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (name);
for (;;)
{
! if (p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '.' && (ISSLASH (p[2]) || !p[2]))
return 1;
do
{
! if (! *p++)
return 0;
}
! while (! ISSLASH (*p));
}
}
--- 201,218 ----
{
char const *p = name + FILESYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (name);
+ if(ISSLASH (*p) ) return 1;
for (;;)
{
! if (p[0] == '.' && p[1] == '.' && (!p[2] || ISSLASH (p[2])))
return 1;
do
{
! if (! *p)
return 0;
}
! while (! ISSLASH (*p++));
}
}
(6739616) /3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>/--------
6739617 2001-07-12 12:41 +0400 /32 rader/ 3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>
Bilagans filnamn: "unzip-5.42.patch"
Importerad: 2001-07-12 21:16 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Externa svar till: 3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <17940>
Bilaga (text/plain) till text 6739615
Ärende: Bilaga (unzip-5.42.patch) till: SECURITY.NNOV: directory traversal and path globing in multiple archivers
------------------------------------------------------------
*** extract.orig Sun Jan 14 00:40:20 2001
--- extract.c Mon Jul 9 14:45:42 2001
***************
*** 154,159 ****
--- 154,161 ----
#ifndef WINDLL
static ZCONST char Far ReplaceQuery[] =
"replace %s? [y]es, [n]o, [A]ll, [N]one, [r]ename: ";
+ static ZCONST char Far TraversalWarning[] =
+ "%s skipped because of directory traversal\n";
static ZCONST char Far AssumeNone[] = " NULL\n(assuming [N]one)\n";
static ZCONST char Far NewNameQuery[] = "new name: ";
static ZCONST char Far InvalidResponse[] = "error: invalid
response [%c]\n"; *************** *** 877,882 ****
--- 879,893 ----
} /* end switch (*answerbuf) */
#endif /* ?WINDLL */
} /* end if (query) */
+ if(*__G__ G.filename=='/' || !strncmp(__G__ G.filename, "../", 3)
+ || strstr(__G__ G.filename,"/../")){
+ skip_entry = SKIP_Y_EXISTING;
+ #ifndef WINDLL
+ Info(slide, 0x81, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(TraversalWarning),
+ FnFilter1(G.filename)));
+ #endif
+ }
if (skip_entry != SKIP_NO) {
#ifdef WINDLL
if (skip_entry == SKIP_Y_EXISTING) {
(6739617) /3APA3A <3APA3A@SECURITY.NNOV.RU>/(Ombruten)