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Ärende: CERT Advisory CA-2000-1, wu-ftpd 2.6.0
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Date:         Fri, 7 Jul 2000 15:49:21 -0700
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CERT Advisory CA-2000-13 Two Input Validation Problems In FTPD

   Original release date: July 7, 2000
   Last revised: --
   Source: CERT/CC

   A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected

     * Any system running wu-ftpd 2.6.0 or earlier
     * Any system running ftpd derived from wu-ftpd 2.0 or later
     * Some systems running ftpd derived from BSD ftpd 5.51 or BSD ftpd
       5.60 (the final BSD release)

Overview

   A vulnerability involving an input validation error in the "site
   exec" command has recently been identified in the Washington
   University ftpd (wu-ftpd) software package. Sites running affected
   systems are advised to update their wu-ftpd software as soon as
   possible.

   A similar but distinct vulnerability has also been identified that
   involves a missing format string in several setproctitle()
   calls. It affects a broader number of ftp daemons. Please see
   Appendix A of this document for specific information about the
   status of specific ftpd implementations and solutions.

I. Description

"Site exec" Vulnerability

   A vulnerability has been identified in wu-ftpd and other ftp
   daemons based on the wu-ftpd source code. Wu-ftpd is a common
   package used to provide file transfer protocol (ftp)
   services. This vulnerability is being discussed as the wu-ftpd
   "site exec" or "lreply" vulnerability in various public
   forums. Incidents involving the exploitation of this
   vulnerability-which enables remote users to gain root
   privileges-have been reported to the CERT Coordination Center.

   The problem is described in AUSCERT Advisory AA-2000.02, "wu-ftpd
   'site exec' Vulnerability," which is available from

   ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/advisory/AA-2000.02

   The wu-ftpd "site exec" vulnerability is the result of missing
   character-formatting argument in several function calls that
   implement the "site exec" command functionality. Normally if "site
   exec" is enabled, a user logged into an ftp server (including the
   'ftp' or 'anonymous' user) may execute a restricted subset of
   quoted commands on the server itself. However, if a malicious user
   can pass character format strings consisting of carefully
   constructed *printf() conversion characters (%f, %p, %n, etc)
   while executing a "site exec" command, the ftp daemon may be
   tricked into executing arbitrary code as root.

   The "site exec" vulnerability appears to have been in the wu-ftpd
   code since the original wu-ftpd 2.0 came out in 1993. Any vendors
   who have based their own ftpd distributions on this vulnerable
   code are also likely to be vulnerable.

   The vulnerability appears to be exploitable if a local user
   account can be used for ftp login. Also, if the "site exec"
   command functionality is enabled, then anonymous ftp login allows
   sufficient access for an attack.

setproctitle() Vulnerability

   A separate vulnerability involving a missing character-formatting
   argument in setproctitle(), a call which sets the string used to
   display process identifier information, is also present in wu-ftpd.
   Other ftpd implementations have been found to have vulnerable
   setproctitle() calls as well, including those from proftpd and
   OpenBSD.

   The setproctitle() vulnerability appears to have been present in
   various ftpd implementations since at least BSD ftpd 5.51 (which
   predates wuarchive-ftpd 1.0). It has also been confirmed to be
   present in BSD ftpd 5.60 (the final BSD release). Any vendors who
   have based their own ftpd distributions on this vulnerable code
   are also likely to be vulnerable.

   It should be noted that many operating systems do not support
   setproctitle() calls. However, other software engineering defects
   involving the same type of missing character-formatting argument
   may be present.

Intruder Activity

   One possible indication you are being attacked with either of
   these vulnerabilities may be the appearance of syslog entries
   similar to the following:

Jul  4 17:43:25 victim ftpd[3408]: USER ftp
Jul  4 17:43:25 victim ftpd[3408]: PASS [malicious shellcode]
Jul  4 17:43:26 victim ftpd[3408]: ANONYMOUS FTP LOGIN FROM
attacker.example.com [10.29.23.19], [malicious shellcode]
Jul  4 17:43:28 victim-site ftpd[3408]: SITE EXEC (lines: 0):
%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%
.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.
f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f
%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%
.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.
f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f
%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%.f%c%c%c%.f|%p
Jul  4 17:43:28 victim ftpd[3408]: FTP session closed

   Details and exploits for both the "site exec" and setproctitle()
   vulnerabilities have been posted in various public forums. Please
   see

   http://www.securityfocus.com/vdb/bottom.html?section=discussion&vid=1387
   http://www.securityfocus.com/vdb/bottom.html?section=discussion&vid=1438
   http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/bulletins/k-054.shtml

   The CERT/CC has received reports of both of these vulnerabilities
   being successfully exploited on the Internet. Please check our
   Current Activity page for updates regarding intruder activity
   involving these vulnerabilities.

II. Impact

   By exploiting any of these input validation problems, local or
   remote users logged into the ftp daemon may be able execute
   arbitrary code as root. An anonymous ftp user may also be able to
   execute arbitrary code as root.

III. Solution

Upgrade your version of ftpd

   Please see Appendix A of this advisory for more information about
   the availability of updated ftpd packages specific for your system.

Apply a patch from your vendor

   If you are running vulnerable ftpd implementations and cannot
   upgrade, you need to apply the appropriate vendor patches and
   recompile and/or reinstall the ftpd server software.

   Appendix A contains information provided by vendors for this
   advisory.  We will update the appendix as we receive more
   information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did
   not hear from that vendor.  Please contact your vendor directly.

Disable ftp services

   If neither an upgrade nor a patch can be applied, the CERT/CC
   recommends disabling all vulnerable wu-ftpd and proftpd
   servers. While disabling "site exec" command functionality or
   anonymous ftp access minimizes exposure to the "site exec"
   vulnerability, neither is a complete solution and may not mitigate
   against the risks involved with exposure to the setproctitle()
   vulnerability.

Appendix A. Vendor Information

BSDI

   Current versions of BSD/OS do not include any version of
   wu-ftpd. The BSDI ftpd is not vulnerable to the reported problems;
   it is not based on the wu-ftpd code.

   The version of ftpd in modern versions of BSD/OS is not vulnerable
   to the generic setproctitle() vulnerabilities.

Caldera Systems, Inc

   Please see CSSA-2000-020.0 regarding the wu-ftpd issue and
OpenLinux:

   ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/OpenLinux/security/CSSA-2000-020.0.txt

   Copyright © 2000 Caldera Systems, Inc.

Conectiva S.A.

   Please see:

   http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&msg=20000623212826.A13925@conectiva.com.br

Debian GNU/Linux

   Please see the following regarding the wu-ftpd "site exec" issue:

   http://www.debian.org/security/2000/20000623

   Copyright © 1997-2000 SPI

FreeBSD, Inc.

   Please see FreeBSD-SA-00:29, Security Advisory for wu-ftpd in the
   ports collection, for complete information. In part it states:

     The wu-ftpd port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of
     FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection,
     which contains over 3400 third-party applications in a
     ready-to-install format. The ports collections shipped with
     FreeBSD 3.5 and 4.0 contains this problem since it was
     discovered after the release. FreeBSD makes no claim about the
     security of these third-party applications, although an effort
     is underway to provide a security audit of the most
     security-critical ports.

   [With respect to setproctitle()] it turns out that FreeBSD fixed
   this bug in the system ftpd back in 1996, so it is not present in
   all versions of FreeBSD since 2.2.0.

   We also ship optional third-party ftpds in the ports collection:
   we had patched wu-ftpd and believed it to be fixed (it was the
   subject of advisory SA-00:29), but in light of the other recent
   email from CERT.  We will re-check to make sure all of the
   vulnerabilities were patched.  Proftpd is also currently
   vulnerable but [has been patched]. Other third-party ftpds may or
   may not be vulnerable at this time (we advise users to install
   ports at their own risk), and we will release security advisories
   as they are discovered and fixed.

Hewlett-Packard Company

   HP is vulnerable, patches in process, watch for the HP security
   bulletin to be issued.

MandrakeSoft Inc.

   Please see the MANDRAKE 7.1 update section for wu-ftpd information
at:

   http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/fupdates.php3

Microsoft Coporation

   The IIS FTP service is not is not affected by these issues.

MIT Kerberos Development Team

   It seems that the MIT Kerberos ftpd is based on BSD ftpd revision
   5.40, and has never contained any serious format string related
   bugs for some reason. It is possible that by defining an
   undocumented CPP macro SETPROCTITLE, calls to setproctitle() can
   be made, however, there is an internally declared setproctitle()
   function that does not take a format string as its argument, and
   is hence not vulnerable.

ProFTPD Project

   Upgrade to ProFTPD 1.2.0

   Please see the discussion concerning setproctitle() at

   http://www.proftpd.org/proftpd-l-archive/00-07/msg00059.html
   http://www.proftpd.org/proftpd-l-archive/00-07/msg00060.html
   http://bugs.proftpd.net/show_bug.cgi?id=121
   http://www.proftpd.net/security.html

OpenBSD

   The setproctitle bug is in OpenBSD. Please see:

   http://www.openbsd.org/errata.html#ftpd

Redhat

   Please see RHSA-2000-039-02 regarding the wu-ftpd issue:

   http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2000-039-02.html

   Copyright © 2000 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.

Slackware Linux Project

   Please see the patches made available regarding the wu-ftpd issue,
at:

   ftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-7.1/patches/wu-ftpd-patch.README

Sun Microsystems

   [...] Our engineering team and they do not feel that Solaris is
   vulnerable.

SuSE Ltd.

   Please see SuSE Security Announcement #53 regarding the wu-ftpd
   issue, at:

   http://www.suse.de/de/support/security/suse_security_announce_53.txt

WU-FTPD Development Group

   The WU-FTPD Development Group's primary distribution site is
   mirrored world-wide. A list of mirrors is available from:

   http://www.wu-ftpd.org/mirrors.txt

   If possible, please use a mirror to obtain patches or the latest
   version.

Upgrade your version of wu-ftpd

   The latest release of wu-ftpd, version 2.6.1, has been released to
   address these and several other security issues:

   ftp://ftp.wu-ftpd.org/pub/wu-ftpd/wu-ftpd-2.6.1.tar.gz
   ftp://ftp.wu-ftpd.org/pub/wu-ftpd/wu-ftpd-2.6.1.tar.gz.asc
   ftp://ftp.wu-ftpd.org/pub/wu-ftpd/wu-ftpd-2.6.1.tar.Z
   ftp://ftp.wu-ftpd.org/pub/wu-ftpd/wu-ftpd-2.6.1.tar.Z.asc

Apply a patch

   The wu-ftpd developers have published the following patch for
   wu-ftpd 2.6.0:

   ftp://ftp.wu-ftpd.org/pub/wu-ftpd/patches/apply_to_2.6.0/lreply-buffer-overflow.patch
   _________________________________________________________________

   The CERT Coordination Center thanks Gregory Lundberg and Theo de
   Raadt for their help in developing this advisory.
   _________________________________________________________________

   Author: Jeffrey S. Havrilla
   ______________________________________________________________________

   This document is available from:
   http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-13.html
   ______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

   Email: cert@cert.org
          Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
          Fax: +1 412-268-6989
          Postal address:
          CERT Coordination Center
          Software Engineering Institute
          Carnegie Mellon University
          Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
          U.S.A.

   CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) /
   EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
   during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

   We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by
   email.  Our public PGP key is available from

   http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

   If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
   information.

Getting security information

   CERT publications and other security information are available from
   our web site

   http://www.cert.org/

   To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send
   email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE
   your-email-address in the subject of your message.

   * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
   Patent and Trademark Office.
   ______________________________________________________________________

   NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University
   and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is"
   basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind,
   either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not
   limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or
   merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the
   material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of
   any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or
   copyright infringement.
   _________________________________________________________________

   Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

   Copyright 2000 Carnegie Mellon University

   Revision History
July  7, 2000:  Initial release

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